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BEYOND BITS, MEMES AND UTILITY
MACHINES: A THEOLOGY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS
SOCIAL RELATIONS
BY DAVID W. OPDERBECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property is about human persons, human cultures, and
human ideas. Persons, cultures, and ideas are more than epiphenomena of
matter. Persons are more than utility maximizing machines; cultures are
more than the sum of individual human beings or ideas, and ideas are more
than discrete bits of unrelated data. Any theory of intellectual property that
reduces human persons, human ideas, and human cultures to bits, memes,
and utility machines will prove inadequate.
This is a problem because prevailing economic and critical theories of
intellectual property are reductionistic in exactly this way. Nothing but pref-
erences and power remain. Such theories lack any meaningful ontology ei-
ther of persons or of information. We need a better theory with a richer
ontology. Intellectual property needs a metaphysic of the relation between
human persons, cultures, and ideas.
Some intellectual property scholars recognize the limits of existing
theories and argue that a “property as social relations” approach could
broaden our understanding of intellectual property.1 A social relations per-
spective suggests that property rights emerge out of, and help construct,
social relationships. Social relations theorists have suggested various ways
in which traditional property rights can be viewed through this social lens.2
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thanks to Frank Pasquale,
Christine Kalanges, Ric Machuga, Rick Garnett, Madhavi Sunder, the participants at the Intellec-
tual Property and Religious Thought Conference at the University of St. Thomas School of Law,
and the participants at the Property Transactions and Transitions Conference at Chapman Law
School, for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 315–16 (2006).
2. See id. at 315–19.
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A social relations approach might help overcome the individualism that un-
dermines the normative force of economic and critical theories.
Madhavi Sunder, for example, calls much of the existing intellectual
property theory “technomics”—a “mash up” of technology and economics
that merely tinkers with economic incentives for creative output.3 Instead of
this narrow vision, Sunder argues that intellectual property rights “structure
social relationships and enable, or disable, human flourishing”—a new vi-
sion Sunder dubs “IP3.”4 Sunder identifies some recent initiatives, such as
the proposed Access to Knowledge Treaty and the treatment of compulsory
licenses under the Doha Round of the TRIPS Agreement, as examples of
communitarian, social relations thinking concerning intellectual property.
But it is unclear, at best, why or how property as social relations theory
could be applied to intellectual property. Is it little more than a screen for a
progressive political agenda? Or is it truly something theoretically weighty?
Maybe these questions could be addressed by delving more deeply into
“social relations” as a general sociological theory of culture and ethics.
There exists, in fact, an important contemporary school of sociological
thought called “network structuralism,” in which the primary unit of society
is the social network rather than the individual.5 Network structuralism is
remarkably congruous with property as social relations theory in its empha-
sis on the social network over the individual. One of the leading network
structuralists, Donald Black, is a well-known legal theorist.6 Network struc-
turalism might offer the theoretical support that social relations theories of
property seem so desperately to need.
Unfortunately, network structuralism as a theoretical framework is
even more obtuse and politicized than property as social relations theory. At
the conclusion of one of his more infamous essays on legal theory, for ex-
ample, Donald Black declared “I am God.”7 This hardly seems a promising
basis upon which to structure intellectual property law, or anything else.
More promisingly, some property scholars are now seeking to weave
property as social relations theory into the fabric of teleological ethics—
particularly virtue ethics.8 One of the most notable of these efforts is cap-
tured in the work of Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Pen˜alver, who attempt
to apply communitarian ethics to property law.9 But even these important
efforts attempt to ignore the elephant in the room: the basic metaphysical
questions, such as the meaning of “persons” and the telos of cultures, that
3. See id. at 315–19.
4. Id. at 285.
5. See infra Section III.
6. See, e.g., Donald Black, The Epistemology of Pure Sociology, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
829 (1995).
7. Id. at 870.
8. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127, 136 (2009).
9. See id. at 134–45.
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inevitably must drive any teleological ethic. Alexander and Pen˜alver state
that they “do not intend to insert [themselves] into philosophical debates
about the metaphysical foundations of human flourishing or how we come
to know what it means to flourish in a distinctively human way.”10 They
suggest, optimistically, that a “broadly appealing” concept of human flour-
ishing can be constructed without engaging in “tangled philosophical
controversies.”11
This will not do. Pragmatism and virtue ethics cannot share the same
bed. Aristotle (to whom Alexander and Pen˜alver appeal) would not recog-
nize the concept of “virtue” apart from a rich realist metaphysical frame-
work. Things have proper ends only if they have “natures” tied to purposes
related to their flourishing. Without a sense of what something is, of why it
exists, there can be no account of virtues and practices that ought to inform
its use and disposition. A “property as social relations” ethic that conceives
of human flourishing as a social construction all the way down ends up as a
tautology. As Etienne Gilson said, “Metaphysics always buries its
undertakers.”12
Thus the crisis in intellectual property theory—and in property theory
and indeed in legal theory more broadly—is a metaphysical crisis. Intellec-
tual property theory in particular requires a thick ontology of human beings,
human cultures, and human ideas. Only as we begin to develop such thick
accounts of life and information can we begin to establish frameworks for
mediating aporias that arise from the apparently competing goals of access
and innovation. Contrary to the claims of many would-be social relations
theorists of intellectual property, culture cannot be reduced to disaggregated
units or memes that can be reassembled any which way. “Rip, mix, and
burn,” without more, is a recipe for little more than ashes.13
Part II of this Essay discusses property as social relations theory and
suggests that, despite a helpful move towards virtue ethics, this approach
remains thin and ungrounded. Part III describes and critiques the related
sociological theory of “network structuralism.” Part IV suggests a move
towards a “phenomenology of property” and offers some metaphysical re-
sources from which a more robust social theory of intellectual property
could be gleaned. Part V seeks to connect the phenomenology of property
to Christian theology. It argues that Christian theology’s belief in life as a
gift, and its resulting ontology of love, offers the strongest—indeed, ulti-
mately, the richest—metaphysical basis for a theory of property and intel-
lectual property as social relations. Part VI ties these themes together in
10. Id. at 136.
11. Id.
12. ETIENNE GILSON, THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE 246 (Charles Scribner’s
Sons 1937).
13. Cf. Sunder, supra note 1.
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theory of persons, cultures, and ideas that could supply richer ground for
intellectual property theory. Part VII concludes.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH PROPERTY AS SOCIAL RELATIONS14
In modern Western jurisprudence, property tends to occupy one of
three spaces: either property represents an original state of nature developed
by human effort; property represents an extension of the autonomous indi-
vidual self; or property represents a fictive social construction. The first of
these poles finds expression in Locke’s labor theory. The second finds ex-
pression in Hegelian personalism. The third finds expression in legal real-
ism and in most contemporary discussions of “cyberspace.”
For Locke, the “state of nature” was creation, as given to humanity by
God, prior to any cultivation or improvement by human beings.15 Locke’s
vision of the state of nature drew heavily on the Jewish-Christian Biblical
narratives of creation and Eden, in which human beings are placed in the
primal Garden and instructed to cultivate and subdue it.16 When a person
exercises these functions of cultivation and dominion, Locke argued, that
person possesses a natural right to the fruits of such labor.17 Moreover,
since human beings no longer inhabit Eden, the reward of a property right
in labor added to nature is necessary to incentivize people to engage in
productive work.18
For Hegel, the center of reality was not the creation of a transcendent
Deity, but rather was the development of the self towards an immanent
Ideal.19 When a person creates something new, Hegel argued, that person
extends his or her being into the fabric of reality—into the Ideal. Rights in
property therefore were an aspect of the integrity of the person.20
Both Locke and Hegel embedded their notions of property within met-
aphysical frameworks, albeit frameworks already twisted and weakened by
modernity. Postmodern, social constructivist perspectives elide metaphysics
and suggest that cultural artifacts such as “property” are constructed “all the
way down” by human choices that are constrained neither by “creation” nor
by “being.”21 This narrative is particularly powerful for many intellectual
14. Portions of this section are drawn from my paper Social Network Analysis of Trade
Secrets and Patents As Social Relations, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 355 (2013).
15. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–300
(1988).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see generally JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDA-
TIONS IN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 151–87 (2002) (discussing Lockean theory of possession
and equality).
19. Hughes, supra note 15, at 330–37.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., ANDR ´E KUKLA, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
4–6 (2000) (discussing metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic constructivism).
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property scholars who press for greater openness and access to cultural
goods. The possession of cultural goods is the means of control over the
power to make the world. Property is power, and power is politics.22
Each of these common spaces of property theory offers some helpful
truths. But each falls short because none addresses more than a fraction of
the human experience of “property.” There is more to it than just nature,
being, or power; in fact, all three are important, and together they produce
something greater than the sum of their parts.
Here, the social relations approach to property steps in and asserts that
property rights represent a web of mutually dependent relationships—
“[p]roperty rights serve human values.”23 One of the fathers of property as
social relations, Joseph Singer, argues that the core of property as social
relations is the reliance interest.24 Singer describes various aspects of prop-
erty law in which the right to control property is circumscribed by another
person’s reliance on access—including adverse possession, easements, pub-
lic trust doctrine, and linkage requirements.25 Singer also highlights circum-
stances under which a reliance interest can limit a property owner’s
freedom of contract—including warranties of habitability and eviction stat-
utes, limitations on mortgage lenders, and good faith requirements for
termination.26
Property as social relations theory recognizes that property rights do
not function solely as boundaries between different individuals or between
individuals and the state. Indeed, the notion of the “individual” itself is very
much in play. Many of the first generation of property as social relations
theorists, such as Duncan Kennedy, worked within a critical legal studies
22. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012).
23. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 663
(1988) (quoting State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971)). Singer notes that:
the social relations approach directs our attention in the following ways: (1) It encour-
ages us to see people as situated in various relationships with others that will continue
over time; (2) It describes social relations as comprising a spectrum from short-lived
relations among strangers to continuing relations in the market to intimate relations in
the family; (3) It comprehends rights as emerging out of understandings that develop
over the course of relationships rather than as being fully articulated at clear decision
points; (4) It encourages us to ask various questions about the relationship between the
parties.
Id. at 655.
24. Id. at 663–65.
25. Id. at 663–78. As Singer concludes, “[t]he right of property owners to exclude others
from their property is not absolute. Non-owners acquire rights of access or control from owners in
a variety of circumstances.” Id. at 678.
26. Id. at 679–92. Singer concludes this section by noting that “[i]n a variety of instances,
compulsory contract terms are implied into agreements that force the parties to share property
rights in ways that protect the ability of the more vulnerable party to rely either on continuation of
the relationship itself or upon continued access to property putatively owned by the more powerful
party.” Id. at 692.
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framework.27 That framework seeks to dissolve power relationships in a
way that appears to eliminate any human subject as the potential beneficiary
of any sort of property interest.28 Others, such as Jennifer Nedelsky, more
explicitly challenge the ontological basis of personhood.29
Drawing on sources such as the process philosophy of Alfred North
Whitehead and the pagan-feminist writer “Starhawk,” Nedelsky suggests
that “we need new ways of conceiving of the tension between the individual
and the collective for which boundary is not an apt metaphor.”30 A true
notion of autonomy, Nedelsky claims, “must begin with the recognition that
relationship, not separation makes autonomy possible.”31
For Nedelsky, the centrality of private property rights to the structure
of the U.S. Constitution reflected a fixation on personal boundaries that was
ripe for dissolution.32 “Property (at least as the Framers understood it),” she
argues, “must distort because it makes inequality rather than liberty, or indi-
vidual autonomy, the central problem of government.”33 Indeed, Nedelsky
thinks that “[t]he entire vision of constitutionalism – the tension between
democracy and individual rights, the distinction and hierarchy between civil
and political rights, the notion of rights as boundaries – rests on a flawed
conception of individual autonomy, a conception captured, amplified, and
entrenched by its association with property.”34
Property, for Nedelsky, no longer “has a single, fixed meaning,” but
instead, “[t]he concept of property reflects collective choices about what
sorts of goods should be given the status of secure entitlement – and those
choices change.”35 However, Nedelsky offers no theory of how social rela-
tions, autonomy, and property should relate. Indeed, she concludes that the
subject is “irreducibly mysterious.”36 Like Kennedy, her solutions devolve
to power and politics: “Not only will the task of law cease to be drawing
boundaries of rights between the individual and the collective, but the
boundary between law and politics will blur.”37
27. See Steven R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 38–44 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). As Munzer notes, Ken-
nedy’s project is difficult to define because of Kennedy’s intent in drawing on postmodern theo-
rists such as Michael Foucault is unclear. Id. at 39.
28. See id. at 38–44.
29. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
162 (1990); see also Munzer, supra note 27, at 56–58.
30. Nedelsky, supra note 29, at 182.
31. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
ALISM 273 (1990).
32. See Nedelsky, supra note 29, at 164–67.
33. Id. at 165.
34. NEDELSKY, supra note 31, at 272.
35. Id. at 269.
36. Nedelsky, supra note 29, at 182; see Munzer, supra note 27, at 56–58 (critiquing Nedel-
sky’s conclusions).
37. NEDELSKY, supra note 31, at 274.
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This drive towards the bottom line of politics exposes a glaring prob-
lem with the property as social relations approach: it does not seem to make
any meaningful predictions about ownership interests. It offers no stable
principles under which transactions could be executed or disputes adjudi-
cated. As Steven Munzer has noted, once the conceptual move is made
towards viewing property as social relations, “it is unclear whether [ex-
isting] legal relations . . . become social relations for purposes of defining
property, and whether all or only some social relations are, or help to con-
stitute, property.”38 This tends to devolve into a play for political control
without a defense of the underlying political commitments that motivate the
move.39
Much of this ambiguity, as Munzer also has noted, arises because
property as social relations theory typically offers, at best, a muddy concep-
tion of the human subject.40 An account of human will and autonomy is
essential to any property theory because all property theories must explain
how, when, and why personal interests in property holdings can arise; how,
when, and why different sets of relations among persons create property
interests; and how, when, and why personal interests in property holdings,
or the interests of particular social groups, must give way to other inter-
ests.41 If personhood is “irreducibly mysterious” as Nedelsky suggests, then
property theory is in trouble.
A new generation of property as social relations scholarship seeks to
provide a more stable foundation for a socially-oriented alternative to the
dominant paradigms. For example, Joseph Singer, together with Gregory
Alexander, Eduardo Pen˜alver, and Laura Underkuffler, recently issued “A
Statement of Progressive Property” in conjunction with a symposium at
Cornell Law School.42 The Statement asserts that property “implicates plu-
ral and incommensurable values,” including “life and human flourishing,
the protection of physical security, the ability to acquire knowledge and
make choices, and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms,” as
well as “wealth, happiness, and other aspects of individual and social well-
being.”43 The resolution of conflicting claims over such values, the authors
assert, “cannot be adequately understood or analyzed through a single met-
38. Munzer, supra note 27, at 45. Munzer notes that Joseph Singer in particular, “does not
explain the metes and bounds of the social-relations approach.” Id. at 63.
39. Cf. id. at 75 (making the argument that there is a defense, however weak, of the underly-
ing political commitments).
40. Id. at 52–56.
41. See id. at 73–74.
42. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743 (2009).
43. Id. at 743.
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ric.”44 Nevertheless, they suggest that “rational choice” about competing
claims “remains possible through reasoned deliberation.”45
In a series of individual papers, the authors of the Statement set out
their ideas about the grounds for such reasoned deliberation. Professor Al-
exander promotes what he calls a “social-obligation norm” as the guiding
principle.46 He connects this norm to the “capabilities” approach to ethics
championed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.47 He offers as a gen-
eral principle that “all individuals have an obligation to others in their re-
spective communities to promote the capabilities that are essential to human
flourishing (e.g., freedom, practical reasoning).”48 Professor Pen˜alver mines
from a similar vein and advances an Aristotelian virtue ethics of property.49
Professor Singer looks to the tradition of the Hebrew Bible, particularly the
Levitical gleanings laws, and suggests a “democratic” approach that empha-
sizes freedom and equality.50
In a response to Professor Pen˜alver, Katrina Wyman raises a series of
questions that could be asked of each of these contributions.51 To para-
phrase Professor Wyman: Why these normative values? How are they dif-
ferent than the consequentialist economic theories they would replace? Or
as Alisdair MacIntyre put it in the context of ethics considered more
broadly: “Whose Justice? Which Rationality?”52
These questions are as acute in the intellectual property context as in
the case of real property. At a meta level, the sorts of values emphasized by
these social relations theorists are already embedded in the substrate of
Western intellectual property law. The U.S. Constitution’s patent clause en-
codes the Enlightenment scientific norms that continue to inform our ideals
of scientific practice: that “science and the useful arts” ought always to
“progress,” and that scientific and literary practices are the means to
achieve that end.53 From the earliest modern multilateral intellectual prop-
erty treaties—the Berne Convention of 1886 and the Paris Convention of
1883—principles of “fair use,” compulsory licenses, and other similar limi-
tations have circumscribed intellectual property rights.54
44. Id. at 744.
45. Id.
46. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 745, 745 (2009).
47. Id. at 745–46.
48. Id. at 745.
49. See Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).
50. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1029 (2009).
51. See Katrina Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics? A Skeptical
Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009).
52. ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1989).
53. U.S. CONST., art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
54. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised July 24, 1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 available at http://www.wipo.
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But the Devil is in the details of adjudication. Utilitarian approaches to
intellectual property rights at least possess the surface advantage of supply-
ing quantifiable principles for courts and juries to follow. Social relations
theorists, of course, question whether economic analysis of law truly pro-
vides any kind of objective quantification of social preferences. As Profes-
sor Pen˜alver notes, “legal economists have not adequately defended the
notion that the diverse and seemingly incommensurable values implicated
by land-use questions can be reduced to such a unitary measure” of utility.55
Law and Economics scholars respond that their “rough and ready” mea-
sures of utility, while not perfect, at least supply a meaningful heuristic for
decision-making.56
Social relations theorists greet this sort of pragmatic posture with ref-
erence to broader notions of justice. If property is a central social institu-
tion, they suggest, just judgments about property rights can only be
obtained through “non-deductive, non-algorithmic reflection,” which
“should be both principled and contextual, and should draw upon critical
judgment, tradition, experience, and discernment.”57 But social relations
theorists seem to pass over whether the social costs and unpredictability of
such contextual, equitable adjudication implicate still other obligations, ca-
pacities, or virtues that might favor settled rules.
Perhaps a basic reason for this impasse is that, even if a “social rela-
tions” approach to property offers more than the reductive Law and Eco-
nomics story, it remains ontologically thin. The Statement of Progressive
Property tells us something merely instrumental about “property”: “Prop-
erty operates as both an idea and an institution.”58 It tells us nothing, how-
ever, about what property is. Indeed, the presumption seems to be that
property is not anything at all—“property” still seems socially constructed
all the way down.
In fact, Alexander and Pen˜alver state that they “do not intend to insert
[themselves] into philosophical debates about the metaphysical foundations
of human flourishing or how we come to know what it means to flourish in
a distinctively human way.”59 They suggest, optimistically, that a “broadly
int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html; see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Intel-
lectual Property, March 20, 1883, as revised July 28, 1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, available at http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html; see also Ruth Okediji, Toward an Interna-
tional Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 107 (2000) (discussing history of the
fair use doctrine).
55. Pen˜alver, supra note 49, at 858. Singer echoes this critique: “efficiency analysis is actu-
ally premised on a controversial version of a controversial moral theory.” Singer, supra note 50, at
1036.
56. See Pen˜alver, supra note 49, at 858; see also MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 145–46 (2006).
57. Alexander et al., supra note 42, at 744.
58. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
59. Gregory S. Alexander & Eduard M. Pen˜alver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 127, 136 (2009).
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appealing” concept of human flourishing can be constructed without engag-
ing in “tangled philosophical controversies.”60 But what is the basis upon
which any such concept might become “broadly appealing” without a thick
account of what “human flourishing” could mean? Even pure law and eco-
nomics accounts of property assume that human beings are rational utility-
maximizing agents. A thicker account of “human flourishing” requires
some underlying theory about why human beings are more than utility ma-
chines; why human ideas are more than disembodied “memes”; and why
human cultures are more than computational structures for disaggregated
bits of data.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH NETWORK STRUCTURALISM
This ontological problem, of course, is not unique to legal studies. In
some ways, with respect to legal studies, the problem can be understood as
a subset of the philosophical and methodological crisis that bedevils the
discipline of sociology.61 Indeed, it is revealing to compare property as so-
cial relations theory with an analogue in the sociological literature: network
structuralism.62
Network structuralists eschew conventional sociology’s emphasis on
variable attributes that might characterize an individual, such as gender,
race, or economic class, and focus instead on “the overall structure of social
relations in networked systems of interaction.”63 For network structuralists,
the network, not the individual, creates social meaning.64 This approach
obviously resonates with property as social relations theory, which likewise
attempts to move beyond methodological individualism towards an inte-
grated social model of analysis.
The most infamous manifesto of network structuralism in relation to
the law is perhaps Donald Black’s article, The Epistemology of Pure Sociol-
ogy.65 Black claimed to have discovered a scientific principle that described
the operation of law without any reference to individual agency, personal
judgment, values, or purposes—indeed, without human beings qua human
60. Id.
61. For a discussion of the crisis of legitimacy in contemporary sociology, see generally
CHRISTIAN SMITH, WHAT IS A PERSON: RETHINKING HUMANITY, SOCIAL LIFE, AND THE MORAL
GOOD FROM THE GROUND UP 221–76 (2010).
62. For an overview of network structuralism, see id. It should be noted that “structuralism”
here refers to the structures of social relationships, and is not linked to the “structuralism” of
postmodern Continental philosophy.
63. Id. at 220.
64. Id. (stating that “[n]etwork structuralists argued that ‘variables sociology’ was stuck with
an atomized, individualistic, psychological ontology inappropriate for a discipline on a mission to
study the social. The alternative unit of analysis and level of explanation, therefore, should be the
structured system of social relations that characterizes the real social world.”) (emphasis in
original).
65. See Donald Black, The Epistemology of Pure Sociology, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 829
(1995).
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beings.66 Black’s Rule was this: “Third-party intervention varies directly
with relational distance.”67 The stronger the social relationship between
disputatious parties, the less likely an outsider, such as a Magistrate, will be
called upon to resolve the dispute.68
Black conceived of the “social universe” as a distinct entity “with its
own ontology—its own existence—something unlike people in the ordinary
sense.”69 For Black, law, as encapsulated in his Rule, “is a natural phenom-
enon with its own patterns of behavior. Just as matter and light behave
according to the same principles throughout the physical universe, so law
behaves according to the same principles throughout the social universe.”70
Black celebrated the fact (or belief) that his Rule “deviates from legal
scholarship of all kinds—legal formalism and legal realism, natural law and
legal positivism, law-and-economics and critical legal studies.”71 Indeed, he
considered all prior notions of jurisprudence to be utterly bankrupt.72
Black’s approach can be considered a form of network structuralism,
though Black claimed to have discovered something sui generis.73 It bears
obvious affinities to property as social relations theory in its effort to find a
basis for law in social structures rather than in the decisions, preferences,
and rights of individuals. In fact, in Black’s Rule, it appears to provide a
firmer basis for decision-making than property as social relations theorists
have thus far developed.
Any such appearance, however, is illusory. Black’s claims, in fact, re-
ject the very notion of “decision-making.” For Black, there are no “persons”
making “decisions” about how to adjust things like trade secret and patent
rights. There is only a deterministic Rule governing the degrees of third
party intervention that inevitably will characterize certain sets of social rela-
tionships. Ironically, rather than describing or predicting how “law” will
function, Black’s Rule elides “law” by reducing “law” to social relations.
Contrary to Black’s claims then, his Rule allows for no predictions about
how entities such as human persons will act because there are no such enti-
ties. In Black’s logic, the only real entity is the social network. Black’s Rule
cannot help us make decisions about intellectual property policy, or any-
thing else, because the operation of his Rule precludes genuine “decisions.”
66. See, e.g., id. at 859 (“my paradigm . . . eliminates the individual as an active force in
human behavior. It removes people from the center of the social universe.”); id. at 864 (“[i]n my
sociology, social life has no goals, purposes, values, needs, functions, interests, intentions, or
anything else not directly observable by anyone. It simply behaves. It just is.”); id. at 867 (“It is
pure science.”).
67. Id. at 835 (emphasis in original).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 859.
70. Id. at 860–61.
71. Black, supra note 65, at 868.
72. Id. at 869 (Black said, “I long ago declared my independence from lawyers. I largely
ignore them.”).
73. See the discussion in SMITH, supra note 61.
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If Black has correctly identified what reality is like, the political vision
behind Joseph Singer’s view of property as social relations and Sunder’s
vision of “IP3” are but epiphenomenal byproducts of the inexorable mecha-
nism of Black’s Rule. Does property as social relations theory necessarily
succumb to this kind of reduction? It is difficult to see how such a fate
could be avoided. If the final unit that matters is a social structure and not
any individuals, the usual currencies of jurisprudence—intention, agency,
purpose, and values—become essentially worthless. Under such circum-
stances, “law” tends to serve only as a description of the unprincipled exer-
cise of power by whatever social group is able to obtain it. In the
concluding section of The Epistemology of Pure Sociology—under the
heading “The Death of the Person”—Black described this process
poetically:
I too was a person. I too lost my place. Epistemologically speak-
ing, I killed myself. What, then, happened to me? Where did I go?
Who am I?
I am social life: I call the police, and I am law. I inflict pain, and I
am violence. I sing, and I am music. I pray, and I am God. I write
these words, and I am sociology. I obey the laws of social life,
and I am greater than myself.74
Fortunately for those of us not yet ready for epistemological suicide and
equally unready to self-identify as God, Black’s Rule is easily falsified.
This is apparent even in the paradigmatic example Black offered to prove
his Rule: “a marital conflict,” he said, “attracts less partisanship than, say, a
conflict between acquaintances or strangers.”75 Anyone who has ever been
involved in an actual litigation in which close colleagues or relations were
pitted against each other—say, a messy divorce—will greet this example
with bemusement.76
IV. IPRS AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
Can religious perspectives offer the thick account of human flourishing
that might inform a social relations approach to Intellectual Property Rights
(IPRs)? Perhaps religious perspectives, at least those drawn from the
Abrahamic faiths, could at least counter Donald Black’s inclination to self-
identify as God. Indeed, perhaps the inclination to self-identify as God is a
core problem for all theories rooted ultimately in radical personal auton-
74. Black, supra note 65, at 870.
75. Id. at 835.
76. In this writer’s many years of litigation experience, it usually was far, far easier to settle
disputes between dispassionate business people than to resolve cases in which the litigants felt
personally betrayed by a family member, friend, or valued colleague. The most venomous cases
this writer handled involved breaches of fiduciary duties in closely held corporations, in which the
dueling principles were family members or had been close friends. And the vitriol in those cases,
which flowed freely and burned hot, paled in comparison to the typical contested divorce.
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omy. The “romantic author,” after all, is the bastard child of the rational
Enlightenment.77
Although intellectual property has not been foregrounded in many con-
versations about theologically informed legal theory, it has not gone en-
tirely unnoticed, particularly within the framework of Catholic Social
Teaching (“CST”). In his Encyclical Caritas in Veritate, for example, Pope
Benedict XVI stated that,
On the part of rich countries there is excessive zeal for protecting
knowledge through an unduly rigid assertion of the right to intel-
lectual property, especially in the field of health care. At the same
time, in some poor countries, cultural models and social norms of
behavior persist which hinder the process of development.78
This statement was built on a number of earlier statements by Vatican offi-
cials and Bishops’ conferences on the problems strong intellectual property
rights can pose for access to medicines in developing countries.79
Professor Thomas Berg has developed this theme in terms of CST’s
“preferential option for the poor.”80 Professor Berg notes that “[i]ntellectual
property, like other forms of property, serves important purposes related to
human dignity, productivity, and especially creativity,” and therefore
“Catholic teaching affirms intellectual property.”81 However, he argues,
limits on intellectual property are “equally important,” particularly where
such limits are “important to benefiting and empowering the poor.”82
This dual sense of the benefits and limits of intellectual property, Pro-
fessor Berg notes, relates to CST’s approach to private property in gen-
eral.83 Private property in CST is not an end in itself, but rather is an
instrument that serves human dignity and flourishing—a “social mortgage”
on goods that “‘are originally meant for all.’”84 In particular, intellectual
property implicates the Biblical theme that human beings mirror and par-
ticipate in God’s creative activity.85 CST holds that every human being
77. Romanticism, from which the “romantic author” trope springs, can be viewed as a re-
sponse to the rational Enlightenment—an effort to locate transcendentality in art and beauty, once
rationalism had killed off God. See, e.g., Kathryn Calley Galitz, Romanticism, Heilbrunn Timeline
of Art History, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/roma/
hd_roma.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
78. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate [Encyclical Letter on Charity in Truth] ¶ 22
(June 29, 2009), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/docu-
ments/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html.
79. See Thomas C. Berg, Intellectual Property and the Preferential Option for the Poor, 5 J.
CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 193 (2008).
80. Id. at 199.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 200.
84. Id. at 200–01 (quoting Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis [Encyclical Letter on
Social Concern] ¶ 42 (Dec. 30, 1987), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_
ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html.).
85. Berg, supra note 79, at 204.
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should be empowered to participate in productive, creative work.86 Profes-
sor Berg therefore concludes, cautiously, “that a degree of skepticism about
IP rights, and an appreciation of the value of limits on those rights, fits with
the general teachings on the option for the poor.”87
Nevertheless, Professor Berg echoes the standard economic justifica-
tion for IPRs; without them, the free rider problem will reduce incentives
for creativity and invention.88 He looks to the flexibilities already built into
Western intellectual property law (and encoded globally in the TRIPS
agreement), along with the growth of voluntary associations in the form of
open source communities, as checks against over-propertization.89 He also
suggests that governments should act to limit IPRs when such rights limit
“access to essential human needs,” such as life-saving drugs; when IPRs are
used by the poor for “education and other noncommercial uses”; for experi-
mental use to encourage innovation; for technology transfer to poor socie-
ties; and for the protection of communal traditional knowledge.90 Although
these recommendations seem to echo standard non-religious treatments
such as the WIPO Development Agenda, Professor Berg concludes that
CST provides a distinctive perspective on property rights and IPRs, rooted
in essential human dignity, rather than merely in welfare maximization.91
Professor Frank Pasquale takes up the themes developed by Professor
Berg while critiquing prevailing law-and-economics approaches to access
to lifesaving drugs in light of CST and Caritas in Veritate.92 Professor Pas-
quale asks a basic question about CST: “To what extent does it conflict with
traditional economic analysis of law?”93 His response, narrated with refer-
ence to the encounter between intellectual property theory and the high
fashion industry, is rich and nuanced. In short, for Professor Pasquale, the
issue is whether the concept of “virtue” can have meaning within, or
against, economic theories of IPRs.94 A virtue ethic of fashion production
would require asking basic questions about vanity and avarice as well as
deeper questions about the fair treatment of wage laborers in developing
86. Id. at 205.
87. Id. at 210.
88. See id. at 212, 214. He later notes, however, that “[t]here are longstanding debates over to
what extent, if at all, copyrights and patents are necessary to encourage creation and innovation.”
Id.
89. Id. at 219–21.
90. Id. at 223–30.
91. Id. at 232–33. Cf. World Intellectual Property Organization, 2007 General Assembly, The
45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, available at http://www.
wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html.
92. See Frank Pasquale, Joining or Changing the Conversation? Catholic Social Thought
and Intellectual Property, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 681 (2011).
93. Id. at 695.
94. Id. at 716–18.
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countries who produce the physical garments in accordance with the “au-
thor’s” designs.95
Professors Berg and Pasquale identify important loci for any “theology
of intellectual property,” including IPRs in relation to the poor and IPRs in
relation to an overarching virtue ethic of production. Professor Berg sug-
gests that such a religiously-informed ethical stance, as reflected in CST,
could be complementary to other perspectives in a pluralistic society. Pro-
fessor Pasquale asks whether a specific religiously-informed perspective,
CST, inherently conflicts with other narratives, but does not really answer
that question. Professors Alexander and Pen˜alver wish to offer a virtue ethic
of property that correlates with presumptions that are broadly held by relig-
ious and non-religious people.
In the following sections, I will attempt to move beyond these themes
of complementarity, conflict, and/or correlation. My radical claim is that
only theology and metaphysics can save the “person,” and that only the
“person” can save intellectual property.
V. CULTURE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE QUEEN OF
THE SCIENCES
The models of complementarity, conflict, and correlation that are de-
scribed in Part IV above each, in their own way, presume that there is
something “other” than a “religious” or “theological” perspective to which
religion and theology must respond. The fact is that all perspectives are at
base metaphysical, and therefore theological.96 It is of course true that an
account based in Christian theology will at points complement, conflict
with, or correlate with accounts offered by other theologies, including “sec-
ular” theologies. But Christian theology asserts that it ultimately provides
the most coherent and complete picture of reality, including social reality.
Christians who wish to offer a theoretical account of social reality, includ-
ing things like IPRs and other forms of positive law, must therefore go
beyond complementarity, conflict, or correlation. Christian thinkers finally
should explain themselves boldly in the grammar and narrative of Christian
theology. The question is one of coherence and completion.
This stance highlights two obvious problems: (1) what about theorists
from other religious traditions; and (2) what about discourse in the public
square?
As Alasdair MacIntyre has observed, at some point differing traditions
become incommensurable.97 Nevertheless, there can be points of meaning-
95. Id. at 720–23.
96. See JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR REASON (2d ed.
2006).
97. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEOLOGY (3d ed.
2007).
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ful contact and dialogue among disparate traditions, particularly when they
share common roots, as do the three major Abrahamic faiths. In fact, this
truth is broadly recognized in the Christian tradition. As theologian David
L. Schindler notes, “love finds an echo, a resonance, in every human heart,
not just in explicitly Christian hearts,” and this is true even if Christians
assert that such love, “is fully revealed only in Jesus Christ.”98
Schindler here echoes Pope Benedict’s widely misunderstood address
at the University of Regensberg. As the Pope stated there, “the faith of the
Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal
Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy . . . .”99
This analogy of being (“analogia entis”) does not imply that God is a being
like human beings—there is no “univocity of being” between humanity and
God—but it does imply that all human beings, made in God’s image, can
know something of the truth inherent in God’s creation.100 Moreover, open-
ness to truth wherever it is found is a hallmark of authentic Christian theol-
ogy. As Anglican theologian John Milbank reminds us,
Christianity is peculiar, because while it is open to difference—to
a series of infinitely new additions, insights, progressions towards
God, it also strives to make all these differential additions a har-
mony, ‘in the body of Christ,’ and claims that if the reality of God
is properly attended to, there can be such a harmony.101
The second question is perhaps more difficult to answer. An important
function of the public square is to provide a forum for mediating such dif-
98. DAVID L. SCHINDLER, ORDERING LOVE: LIBERAL SOCIETIES AND THE MEMORY OF GOD
168 (2011).
99. Pope Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason and the Universities: Memories and Reflections (Sept.
12, 2006), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/
documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html.
100. Cf. Pope Paul VI, Nostra Aetate [Encyclical Letter on the Relation of the Church to Non-
Christian Religions] ¶ 2 (Oct. 28, 1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html, (proclaiming:
Religions . . . that are bound up with an advanced culture have struggled to answer the
same questions by means of more refined concepts and a more developed language.
Thus in Hinduism, men contemplate the divine mystery and express it through an inex-
haustible abundance of myths and through searching philosophical inquiry. They seek
freedom from the anguish of our human condition either through ascetical practices or
profound meditation or a flight to God with love and trust. Again, Buddhism, in its
various forms, realizes the radical insufficiency of this changeable world; it teaches a
way by which men, in a devout and confident spirit, may be able either to acquire the
state of perfect liberation, or attain, by their own efforts or through higher help, supreme
illumination. Likewise, other religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness
of the human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing “ways,” comprising teachings,
rules of life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy
in these religions. She regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life,
those precepts and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she
holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all
men. Indeed, she proclaims, and ever must proclaim Christ “the way, the truth, and the
life” (John 14:6), in whom men may find the fullness of religious life, in whom God has
reconciled all things to Himself.
101. John Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa in Forty Two Re-
sponses to Unasked Questions, 7 MODERN THEOLOGY 225, 227–28 (1991).
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ferences and for working out compromises that allow differing communities
and traditions to coexist in a civil society. The difficulty is well-illustrated
by the exchange between Joseph Ratzinger and Ju¨rgen Habermas shortly
before Ratzinger became Pope Benedict.102 Habermas argued that political
liberalism is “a nonreligious and postmetaphysical justification of the nor-
mative bases of the democratic constitutional state.”103 The stability of such
a state in light of competing religious and secular interests, Habermas
claimed, depends on legal and democratic procedures that provide a neutral
procedural framework for adjudicating disputes.104 He identified this as a
“proceduralist understanding of the constitutional state, inspired by
Kant . . . .”105 For Habermas, this opens space for both religious and non-
religious viewpoints: “The neutrality of the state authority on questions of
world views,” he says, “guarantees the same ethical freedom to every citi-
zen.”106 And this means that religious citizens possess, “the right to make
contributions in a religious language to public debates.”107
Cardinal Ratzinger noted that he was “in broad agreement,” with
Habermas “about a postsecular society, about the willingness to learn from
each other, and about self-limitation of both sides.”108 Yet Ratzinger fo-
cused not on procedure but on the substantive relationship between law and
power.
For Ratzinger, the key question was, “what must be the characteristics
of law if it is to be the vehicle of justice rather than the privilege of those
who have the power to make the law?”109 Ratzinger agreed with Habermas
that democratic forms of government help secure the justice of the law
against the will to power, “precisely because it is everyone’s law.”110 Yet,
he argued, “majorities, too, can be blind or unjust, as history teaches us very
plainly,” and so, “the majority principle always leaves open the question of
the ethical foundations of the law.”111 A purely procedural state, then, will
not suffice. A just society always must inquire, “whether there is something
that is of its very nature inalienably law, something that is antecedent to
every majority decision and must be respected by all such decisions.”112
Ratzinger illustrated this problem with reference to the Catholic jurist
Francisco de Vitoria, who argued that the Spanish Catholics were not le-
102. J ¨URGEN HABERMAS & JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, DIALECTICS OF SECULARIZATION:
ON REASON AND RELIGION (2006).
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id. at 27.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 51.
107. Id.
108. HABERMAS & RATZINGER, supra note 102, at 77.
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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gally justified in making war against native peoples in the Americas, even
though sources of positive law at the time authorized Christian princes to
punish heretics and others who refused the Christian faith.113 De Vitoria
appealed to an overarching concept of ius gentium, an unwritten law of the
nations that governs even Christian princes. This was not only a procedural
construct.114 Rather, it was rooted in God’s ultimate dominion over all of
creation.115 A similar notion of substantive justice, Ratzinger suggested, in-
forms contemporary ideas of universal international human rights.116 For
Ratzinger, “reason” and “religion” inhabit the same dialectical space over
matters of public concern:
Religion must continually allow itself to be purified and struc-
tured by reason; and this was the view of the Church Fathers, too.
However, we have also seen in the course of our reflections that
there are also pathologies of reason, although mankind in general
is not as conscious of this fact today. There is a hubris of reason
that is no less dangerous.117
Habermas’ procedural mediation and Ratzinger’s substantive natural
law orientation offer two possible frames for explicitly religious discourse
in the public square. Perhaps these are in fact two sides of the same coin. As
John Milbank notes, “[f]or Christianity, true community means the freedom
of people and groups to be different, not just to be functions of a fixed
consensus, yet at the same time it totally refuses indifference . . . .”118 This
insight brings us back full circle to the specific context of intellectual prop-
erty and social relations. “Culture” is the substantive product of human rela-
tionships that are structured according to various procedural norms.119
Intellectual property law is one of the key legal systems that governs the
production and diffusion of culture in our society. Our task is to articulate
both transcendent substantive grounds for legal rules about cultural ex-
change and procedural mechanisms for resolving disputes about the nature
of those transcendent grounds without refusing the hospitality of hearing
such competing claims on their own terms. The next two sections offer one
effort at such an account in relation to IPRs.
113. Id. at 67–68. See also FRANCISCO DE VITTORIA, DE INDUS DE JURE BELLI (Ernest Nys,
ed. 1964), available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/De_Indis_De_Jure_Belli/Part_2.
114. DE VITTORIA, supra note 113; HABERMAS & RATZINGER, supra note 102, at 67–68.
115. DE VITTORIA, supra note 113; HABERMAS & RATZINGER, supra note 102, at 67–68.
116. HABERMAS & RATZINGER, supra note 102, at 70.
117. Id. at 77.
118. Milbank, supra note 101, at 228.
119. See D. STEPHEN LONG, THEOLOGY AND CULTURE: A GUIDE TO THE DISCUSSION 8 (2010)
(stating “[c]ulture is a metaphor for a kind of ‘cultivation’ that occurs to people through their
practices, language, communities, doctrine, etc.”).
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VI. CULTURE, SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND METAPHYSICS
A. Towards a Phenomenology of Persons and Culture
Nothing we observe in the universe is flat. By “flat” I mean having
only one aspect or “layer.” Consider an apple tree. What is it? Is it the
product of a small seed? Is it the seed-carrier—the potentiality—of new
apple trees? A collection of plant cells? A system of sap, bark, and leaves?
A particular arrangement of DNA? An expression of physical laws? Is it
something aesthetically satisfying to me, something beautiful, fragrant with
blooms in spring, heavy with fruit in autumn, stark and serene in winter? Is
it a source of nourishment for humans and other animals? All of these
things (and more) comprise some of what we mean by “apple tree,” but
none of them are what an “apple tree” is. The reality that is “apple tree”
cannot be reduced to any one of its aspects or layers.120
It is possible to think of these aspects or layers hierarchically, with
“higher” layers that emerge from “lower” ones. Physical laws emerge from
quantum probabilities; molecules emerge from physical laws; seeds, wood,
bark, sap, and leaves emerge from complex arrangements of molecules; and
beauty and delight emerge from the connection of skin, flesh, and core to
human sense perception.121 “Apple tree” emerges from all of this (and
more) combined with the human cultural experience of these things we call
“apple trees.”
Notice that some “layers” can impinge or “supervene” on lower
ones—for example, human sense perception and cultural experience do
something to this thing confronting the subject in order for it to become an
“apple tree.” But notice also that an “apple tree” is not merely a cultural
construction. The word or signifier “apple tree,” of course, could be arbi-
trary, but there is an objective reality to the thing signified. The layer of
human sense perception and cultural experience supervenes upon, but does
not create, the lower-order reality from which it emerges.
Sociologist Christian Smith draws these strands together in a critical
realist framework. In a critically realist approach to culture and human per-
sonhood, Smith suggests, “[h]uman beings do have an identifiable nature
that is rooted in the natural world, although the character of human nature is
such that it gives rise to capacities to construct variable meanings and iden-
120. For a discussion of this sort of phenomenological reasoning, see ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI,
INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 4 (2000) (noting that “phenomenology, in its classical form,
insists that parts are only understood against the background of appropriate wholes, that manifolds
of appearance harbor identities, and that absences make no sense except as played off against the
presences that can be achieved through them.”).
121. Human sense perception, of course, is an emergent property of an even more complex set
of relations that give rise to the human “person.” See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 61 (explaining that
human persons are composed through emergence of elements that together create a higher level of
existence than those elements that created them).
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tities . . . .”122 Culture is a social construction, but it is not merely a social
construction. Human beings are social, but they are not subsumed by the
social. The reality we inhabit is “stratified”: it includes both the reality of
individual conscious human agents and the reality of the social structures
that emerge from the cultures created by those agents.123 These “personal”
and “cultural” layers of the world interact with each other dynamically,
each continually informing and changing the other.124
Smith’s approach is helpful, but perhaps it does not go far enough. For
Smith, as for critical realists in general, the phenomena of human culture
remain subject to some degree of granular disaggregation, at least analyti-
cally. A phenomenological approach suggests that no “thing” can be broken
into components and still comprise that “thing.” The genes that encode for
apple trees are not apple seeds, apple seeds are not apple trees, and apple
trees are not apples. The critical realist framework of stratification, emer-
gence, and supervenience functions as a very useful heuristic device, but to
describe what an apple is, we must approach the phenomenon of “apple” in
its fullness. To know whether something falls into the kind “apple,” we
must hold an ideal of everything an apple is, and compare the subject to the
ideal.
And because of the transcendence of the ideal concept of “apple tree,”
we can begin to speak of the relative excellence of particular instantiations
of apple trees. What is an “excellent” apple tree? What distinguishes the
excellent example of an apple tree from a poor one? We can only ask such
questions if “apple tree” means something more than the particular physical
specimen at hand, whether robust and fecund or diseased and withered.
How does all of this apply to “property” and “intellectual property?”
The connection to property as social relations theory should be obvious.
The thing we call “property” in patents, copyrights, and trade secrets is the
reality that emerges from particular arrangements of human subjects to each
other. Joseph Singer helpfully speaks of this as the “reliance interest” in
property, although he does not seem to ascribe an ontological significance
to this “interest.”125 But a “phenomenology” of property suggests that
something irreducibly real does, indeed, both lie under and arise from these
relations.
122. SMITH, supra note 61, at 10.
123. See CRITICAL REALISM: ESSENTIAL READINGS XI (Margaret Archer, et al. eds., 1998)
(noting that “critical realism claims to be able to combine and reconcile ontological realism,
epistemological relativism, and judgmental rationality.”) (emphasis in original); see also ROY
BHASKAR, A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE (2d ed. 1997) (critiquing a positivist view of science in
favor of a realist view, drawing on the connection between the natural world and the social world).
124. BHASKAR, supra note 123, at 39; DONALD JUDD, CRITICAL REALISM AND COMPOSITION
THEORY 50 (2003) (stating that “society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices
and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they
did so.”) (internal quotation omitted).
125. Singer, supra note 23.
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Such a phenomenological approach supports a metaphysically thick or
“realist” account of entities.126 For “apple” to remain irreducible to skin,
flesh, seeds, genes, and so-on, there must exist an ideal concept of “apple.”
Any such concept necessarily transcends any particular instantiation of an
apple. There must be an ideal transcendent of our physical reality to which
our physical reality relates.
As with apple trees, so it is with persons. Despite the persistent efforts
of eliminative materialists and many neuroscientists, and despite the con-
structivist reductionism of social theorists such as Donald Black, it is im-
possible to reduce the human person to any one aspect or layer of what
comprises a human being. As theologian Connor Cunningham notes,
[T]he problem with any bid to eliminate commonsense psychol-
ogy—and normative, teleological explanations with it—is that the
remaining physical explanations will be much more mysterious.
An ersatz spiritualism would take the stage to perform its danse
macabre of 0’s and 1’s, and we would be forced to live in a
wholly skeptical, inexplicable world. For example, why did Susan
get the cork-screw? Why did NASA fly to the moon?127
And since “writings and discoveries” are produced by persons, the
same is true of the stuff of intellectual property law. As Cunningham also
argues, “we cannot even form meaningful sentences if there are no subjects
of experience (us, in other words) to interpret them; otherwise they would
simply be a random string of sounds. Science would be impossible.”128 In
the specific language of intellectual property law, there is no “secret” with-
out a social-linguistic context for secrecy. There is no “invention” without a
social-linguistic context for “science” and the “useful arts.”129 There is no
copyrightable “work” without the social-linguistic context for creativity.
These irreducible qualities provide the meaning for legal claims when the
relational context is disrupted and delimit the scope of any potential rem-
edy. Only a realist account of the person as a social being puts the “social”
into intellectual property as social relations.
126. As discussed in Section VI infra, I believe Christian theology offers resources for the
construction of a metaphysically robust phenomenology of intellectual property as social relations:
the generative, creative act as participation in the gift of culture. As a law professor with aspira-
tions to the status of Christian theologian, I would assert that only Christian theology finally and
fully offers the necessary resources. Indeed, as a Christian theologian I ultimately would argue
that there is no such category as the “secular.” See MILBANK, supra note 96, at 9 (“Once, there
was no ‘secular.’”). But Christian theology emphasizes the presence of wisdom and reason in all
traditions that seek the truth—and therefore the project of construing intellectual property as so-
cial relations in terms of participation and gift can be pursued in common by persons of various
religious traditions or of no religious tradition.
127. CONNOR CUNNINGHAM, DARWIN’S PIOUS IDEA: WHY THE ULTRA-DARWINISTS AND CREA-
TIONISTS BOTH GET IT WRONG 354–55 (2010).
128. Id. at 355.
129. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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B. Ontology of the Social: the Gift of Culture
What sort of narrative could underwrite such a realist account of the
social? This question echoes a long and rich debate in Western philosophi-
cal and religious thought over the problem of “universals.” The problem of
“universals” refers to whether there are real universal “types” of things or
only “particular” things that happen to go by certain names (“nominal-
ism”).130 In Section IV above, for example, I asked what we mean by the
term “apple tree.” This sort of question inquires about whether “apple” re-
flects a universal type, ideal, form, substance, or entity common to all
things called “apple,” or whether there are merely particular entities that are
called “apple” for reasons of only convenience or convention.
Western philosophical and theological thought, at least until the Medi-
aeval Period, mostly assumed the truth of universals. This includes the He-
braic focus on Wisdom; Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neo-Platonic efforts to
articulate a transcendent causal principle that does not render the material
world illusory; and the Patristic Christian relocation of Hebrew and Greek
idealism into the mind of God.131
In Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy, for example, the excellence
of a particular instantiation of a thing inheres in that particular instantia-
tion’s participation in the perfect “Form” of the thing. The reality of the
perfect Form permits us to understand the relations between particular
things—“these are all apples”—as well as to appraise the virtues of some
instance of a thing—“this is a really excellent (or really bad) apple.” For
Neo-Platonic thinkers such as Plotinus, the “One” or “the Good” was the
cause of all things in the universe. Other principles emanated from the
“One,” including the “Intellect,” which was the first entity that derived from
or depended upon the “One,” and was the source of the “Forms” and the
“Soul,” which was the principle of desire in embodied things.132 This in-
stantiated a hierarchy of being, with all things deriving from and participat-
ing in the “One.”133
In the Hebraic tradition, “Wisdom” is often personified as a creative
gift from God in which all people are invited to share. The Hebrew Scrip-
tures frequently speak of Wisdom as the source of creation:
By wisdom the LORD laid the earth’s foundations,
by understanding he set the heavens in place;
130. For a discussion of the problem of universals in relation to nominalism, see Gonzalo
Rodriquez-Pereyra, Nominalism in Metaphysics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http:/
/plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/#Uni (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
131. For an excellent discussion of the relation between Christian theology and Greek philoso-
phy, see ADRIAN PABST, METAPHYSICS: THE CREATION OF HIERARCHY (2012).
132. See Lloyd Gerson, Plotinus, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/plotinus/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); see also FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J., A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL. I: GREECE AND ROME 486–90 (1993) (providing further explana-
tion of the Platonic forms).
133. COPLESTON, supra note 132, at 486–90.
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by his knowledge the watery depths were divided,
and the clouds let drop the dew.134
Wisdom’s call encompasses all of humanity and is the source of life itself:
Does not wisdom call out?
Does not understanding raise her voice?
At the highest point along the way,
where the paths meet, she takes her stand;
beside the gate leading into the city,
at the entrance, she cries aloud:
“To you, O people, I call out;
I raise my voice to all mankind.
You who are simple, gain prudence;
you who are foolish, set your hearts on it.
. . . .
For those who find me find life
and receive favor from the LORD.”135
“Life,” then, extends beyond any particular material example of a person or
thing and reaches into, as it flows down from, the mind of God.
In Patristic Christian theology, the locus of perfection is not Plato’s
Forms, or the Neo-Platonic “One,” or Wisdom personified but unidentified,
but rather is the Triune God revealed in Jesus Christ. It is God the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit—three persons and one substance, each a person yet
each interpenetrating the other and participating together in the simple
perfection of mutual fellowship and love. Whatever else exists is not God
but is God’s creation. The being of all creation is the pure gift of the Triune
God who lacked nothing in Himself. And as God’s creative gift, all of crea-
tion participates in God’s own life—His fellowship and love.136
For Patristic Christian theology, Creation had purpose: to participate in
God’s own life. The virtues of things in creation, including human beings,
inhered in their participation in this gift of being. Where there is vice there
is disorder, a sort of anti-creation or un-making—a refusal to participate in
“life” and an inexplicable participation instead in death. In this sense, Pa-
tristic Christian theology adopted some of the grammar and structure of
Greek and Hebraic thought, but significantly modified elements of both
streams of thought, to preserve both the “otherness” of God from creation
and the participation of creation in God’s life.137
134. Proverbs 3:19–20 (New International Version).
135. Proverbs 8:1–5, 35 (New International Version).
136. See generally, e.g., DAVID BRADSHAW, ARISTOTLE EAST AND WEST: METAPHYSICS AND
THE DIVISION OF CHRISTENDOM (2007) (discussing Eastern and Western traditions and their funda-
mental metaphysical themes); COPLESTON, supra note 132 (discussing the theory of God and met-
aphysics); FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J., A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL. II: MEDIEVAL
PHILOSOPHY (1993) (further discussing the theory of God and metaphysics).
137. See, e.g., JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, VOL. 1: THE EMERGENCE OF THE CATHOLIC TRADITION (100–600)
(1975) (explaining the development of the Christian church between 100 and 600).
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So what happened? Many contemporary historical theologians and his-
torians of ideas have narrated how “nominalism” and “voluntarism” subse-
quently came to influence Christian theology, beginning in earnest in the
High Scholastic period of the late Middle Ages.138 To our modern ears, the
term “Ockham’s Razor” signifies a principle of the “scientific method”: the
notion that, all other things being equal, between a simpler and a more
complex explanation for a set of observations, the simpler explanation
should initially be preferred. But this methodological principle derives, per-
haps somewhat tenuously, from the fourteenth-century monk William of
Ockham, whose voluntarist philosophy tended to reduce all principles of
causation to the pure, unbridled will of God. In consequence, this reduced
both the “otherness” of God and creation’s participation in that otherness to
inconsequentiality.139
Ockham’s theology was influenced by other Scholastic thinkers, such
as Duns Scotus, who flattened the analogical distance between God’s being
and creation in a way that seemed to erase the distance between them.140
The tendencies to equate of God’s being with the being of creation (the
“univocity of being”), to reduce God’s being to His will (“voluntarism”),
and to view things in creation only as particulars instantiated by God’s arbi-
trary will (“nominalism”), filtered through the social upheavals of the Ref-
ormation period and were distilled in the secularizing force of the
Enlightenment.141 The French mathematician Pierre Simon-Laplace
(1749–1847) could dismiss God as an unnecessary hypothesis because the
being of God had already been rendered superfluous.142
138. See, e.g., BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS
REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY (2012); MICHAEL ALLEN GILLESPIE, THE THEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF MODERNITY (2010) (discussing the role of religion and theology in the development of
modernity); CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2009) (discussing the development of secularism
in Western society and emphasizing that secularism and religion are not rival, mutually-exclusive
theories).
139. See Conor Cunningham, Natura Pura, the Invention of the Anti-Christ: A Week With No
Sabbath, 37 COMMUNIO: INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC REVIEW 244, 246 (2010) (noting that “natu-
ralism is itself a product of bad theology . . . religious people have bought into the idea that faith is
‘supernatural.’ And here the atheist is in complete agreement, religion is indeed something ex-
tra . . . but for them, in the name of economy, again Ockham’s razor, we can just ignore it, setting
it adrift, to the point where it becomes irrelevant.”).
140. For a general discussion of Duns Scotus’ life and work, see Thomas Williams, John Duns
Scotus, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/
(last visited Dec. 7, 2013).
141. Of course, intellectual history is never this simple. As Michael Hanby notes, we should
not “suggest a neat genealogy linking Ockham directly to the architects of early modern science. It
is enough that Ockhamism shaped the ambient scholasticism of the seventeenth century.”
MICHAEL HANBY, NO GOD, NO SCIENCE?: THEOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, BIOLOGY 111 (2012).
142. See CARL BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 494 (2d ed. 1991). This account of
Laplace’s comments might be apocryphal, but it remains influential. See, e.g., FUNDAMENTALISMS
AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY, AND EDUCATION 30 (Martin E. Marty, R.
Scott Appleby, Helen Hardacre, Everett Mendelsohn, eds., 1997).
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And so, popular contemporary theories of culture seek to elide God
and metaphysics as useless vestigial appendages. The market-driven legal
systems of the West view culture as something reducible to atomistic, com-
moditizable bits of “information.” Our dominant legal structures governing
access to “information” focus primarily on the monetary incentives required
for individuals to produce cultural “products” for exchange. The exceptions
built into these structures, such as “fair use” of copyrighted material and
compulsory licensing of patents, typically are theorized according to a
purely utilitarian calculus. In this calculus, aggregate “public welfare” is
putatively enhanced through somewhat broader dissemination of “inputs”
or “infrastructure” that might facilitate even greater production—whether of
units of cultural goods or years of life. Neither the rules nor their exceptions
can explain “why” any of this is “good,” aside from the fact that it “works”
at a “pragmatic” level—whatever terms like “works” or “pragmatic” might
mean in a nominalistic world.143
C. Theology and Social Relations
1. The Purposes of Persons and Cultural Gifts
Here we reach a crucial question: Can theology once again redeem the
ashes of Western philosophy? Can theology save metaphysics?144 Can the-
ology save even something as mundane as intellectual property?
In his encyclical Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict argues that theol-
ogy is necessary and that concerns about economics, politics, and property
cannot be reduced to a presumptive “science”:
The excessive segmentation of knowledge, the rejection of meta-
physics by the human sciences, the difficulties encountered by
dialogue between science and theology are damaging not only to
143. Still, Idealism, though gravely wounded, never died. The Continental philosophical tradi-
tion, exemplified by thinkers such as George Friedrich Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heideg-
ger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre, has focused on “the structure of various types
of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and voli-
tion to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity.”
David Woodruff Smith, Phenomenology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). The experience of something, in
Continental phenomenological thought, is always directed towards that thing through ideas, con-
cepts, images and the like, which are distinct from the thing signified. Id. Things, then, are never
merely atomistic things-in-themselves, but rather exist always in relation to social and linguistic
structures and the purposes of intentional agents. Id. Yet—and this is crucial—the naivete´ of
earlier ontologies, for these modern Continental thinkers, has forever been lost. Modernity, for
most of their present-day acolytes, destroyed its antecedents, but in turn has dissolved into post-
modernity, in which “transcendent” reality is really immanently constructed through subjective
experiences and grammars. So it may seem that any “social relations” based theory of culture and
intellectual property must boil down to power and politics after all.
144. The title of this subsection plays on MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND
SECULAR REASON, supra note 96. See also John Milbank, Only Theology Saves Metaphysics: On
the Modalities of Terror, in BELIEF AND METAPHYSICS 452 (Peter M. Candler & Conor Cunning-
ham, eds., 2007).
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the development of knowledge, but also to the development of
peoples, because these things make it harder to see the integral
good of man in its various dimensions. The “broadening [of] our
concept of reason and its application” is indispensable if we are to
succeed in adequately weighing all the elements involved in the
question of development and in the solution of socio-economic
problems.145
A deep sense of relation between the human person and a God who bestows
creation as gift is essential to CST’s political vision, including its comments
on IPRs. As Pope Benedict further argues in Caritas in Veritate,
If man were merely the fruit of either chance or necessity, or if he
had to lower his aspirations to the limited horizon of the world in
which he lives, if all reality were merely history and culture, and
man did not possess a nature destined to transcend itself in a su-
pernatural life, then one could speak of growth, or evolution, but
not development.146
For Christian thinkers, there can be no notion of “development” apart
from the goal for which human beings were created: union with God. The
project of recovery then—certainly for intellectual property scholars work-
ing within the Christian tradition—is one of excavating the ancient Chris-
tian ontology of the gift. Indeed, argues theologian John Milbank, “the
transcendental norm of universal gift-exchange can only be recognized by a
combination of moral commonsense and Christian faith. For only love can
desire that there should be unlimited association in the true sense: a society
of unlimited reciprocation, a society of friends.”147 In his essay “The Trans-
cendality of the Gift,” Milbank asks, “[i]s the gift purely a social matter, or
is it also ontological,” and “[i]s the gift the echo of divine creation and of
divine grace? And otherwise, does it lose all reality?”148 Milbank traces two
streams of thought about the notions of “gift,” the “given,” and “exchange.”
One is the stream of Continental phenomenology, which tended to reduce
the “given” to the experience of the individual subject, and thereby to elide
the “given” and flatten the “gift” to something unilaterally given within a
relationship of power and hierarchy.149 The other is the analytic stream in
which the “gift” is “only disguised contract . . . a kind of loan secured by
capitalized, ungivable items . . . .”150 Seeking a way forward, Milbank notes
that,
145. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 78, at ¶ 31 (quoting, in part, Pope
Benedict XVI, Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg (Sept. 12, 2006)).
146. Id. at ¶ 29.
147. JOHN MILBANK, The Transcendality of the Gift, in THE FUTURE OF LOVE: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 363 (Cascade 2009).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 357–58 (asking, “Is the gift unilateral or is it reciprocal?” and “Is the unilateral/
reciprocal contrast absolute?”).
150. Id. at 357.
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In a sense, the Christian project searches for the “middle” be-
tween gift-exchange on the one hand, and distributive justice with
market exchange on the other. Yet the latter are essential to en-
sure the true appropriateness of the gift, which is essential to the
gift as such. A global gift-exchange, as inaugurated by Christian-
ity, ceases to be one of fetishized items, but becomes one of all
that is truly valuable from the perspective of love and universal
harmony.151
The gift then, for Milbank, is rooted in love, which is the true source of
justice. The central fact of love is that given by which we must pursue, “the
continuous task of judgment and discernment as to what is valuable and
when and where.”152 While Greek theology emphasized the city and the gift
and the reciprocity of virtues among people whose varying social stations
defined their ends, “Christianity stresses [reciprocity] still more by seeing
justice as fulfilled in charity—an unlimited concern to fulfill the real poten-
tial of all, and of all in harmony with all.”153 The phenomenon of gift-
exchange is thus, “like a natural anticipation in all human societies of the
society of supernatural grace.”154
But if this is so, if gift-exchange anticipates grace, why do we so often
experience it as a desiccated thing, as mere power or mere contract? The
problem is theological. “Deviant forms of Christianity themselves,”
Milbank says, “underwrite this ride to an earthly Tartarus.”155 It is a loss in
Western culture of God’s transcendence, a reduction of God to a being
univocal with our own, a voluntaristic prioritization of God’s will and an
ontotheological reduction of God to just another, though very powerful, be-
ing-in-the-universe.156 The gift is thus no longer given within a society of
love, but is rather something arbitrarily imposed or withheld. And this, in
turn, produced a social simulacrum of a gift culture:
The simulacrum unites us all only by bonds of contract which
seek to make one egoistic desire match with another—without
friendship, generosity, or concern for the whole social organism.
But this requires ever more draconian state policing in order that
contractual freedom not be abused—for nothing in this system
can ever explain to the individual why he or she should not abuse
it. Indeed, it rather suggests that it ought to be abused, if the indi-
vidual can get away with it.157
151. Id. at 360.
152. Id.
153. MILBANK, supra note 147, at 360.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 361–63 (stating that “[t]ranscendental gift-exchange was theologically undone”
and that “the loss of transcendental gift-exchange is the result of a heterodox Christian
development.”).
157. Id. at 362.
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This culture of the false gift produces grave consequences for creativity and
cultural production:
In this way, the system tends to increasing delirium: increasing
innovation for the sake of it; increasing attempts by individuals or
groups to gain arbitrary power over each other and at the same
time increasing attempts to counteract anarchy with iron
discipline.158
Perhaps many intellectual property scholars, particularly those dis-
posed in some way towards social relations theory, might offer this last
quote as a description of some of the activities of the RIAA, MPAA,
PhARMA, or BIO.159 The Western intellectual property system embedded
globally in the TRIPS agreement assumes that creativity and innovation
will not occur unless self-regard can be secured as a primary interest. Many
commentators have observed that this presents a deracinated picture of cul-
ture and innovation.160 Even scholars who advocate “open source” produc-
tion methods speak in individualistic terms. Yochai Benkler, for example,
emphasizes that open source methods can best enable individuals to accom-
plish their “life plans.”161 It is all about self-actualization.
Self-regard, of course, is not in itself a vice, and mutuality of exchange
is a healthy component of a flourishing community.162 Creators and innova-
tors who contribute generously to their communities often hope for, and
receive, satisfaction and recognition from their contributions. The desire to
be part of something bigger than one’s self, to employ one’s talents in a
way that benefits the broader human community, and to “make a differ-
ence” are proper desires. As Pope Benedict stated in his encylcial Caritas in
Veritate, “Charity goes beyond justice, because to love is to give, to offer
what is ‘mine’ to the other; but it never lacks justice, which prompts us to
give the other what is ‘his,’ what is due to him by reason of his being or his
acting.”163 Yet, like all normal desires, it can be twisted away from its
proper ends and become something grotesque. Something is amiss when the
law reinforces misplaced desires and discourages desires ordered to their
true ends.
158. Id.
159. RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (RIAA), http://www.riaa.com/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2014); MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (MPAA), http://www.mpaa.org
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014); THE PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
(PHARMA), http://www.phrma.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014); THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
ORGANIZATION (BIO), http://www.bio.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
160. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 22; SUNDER, supra note 22.
161. BENKLER, supra note 22.
162. See, e.g., Eberhard Schockenhoff, The Theological Virtue of Charity, in THE ETHICS OF
AQUINAS 244 (Stephen J. Pope, ed., 2002); JEAN PORTER, NATURE AS REASON: A THOMISTIC
THEORY OF THE NATURAL LAW 203–30 (2004).
163. Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 78, at ¶ 6 (emphasis in original).
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The law should instead recognize the value of the gift and encourage
habits of generosity. Already in Western intellectual property law there is
encoded a broader social purpose—“to encourage the progress of science
and the useful arts”—although recent U.S. Supreme Court precedents have
emasculated that notion.164 Intellectual property should more closely align
with this broader purpose, within an overarching framework of cultural pol-
icy in support of the virtue of generosity.
A “gift” produces good for its recipients. The receipt of a gift allows
the receiver to flourish and, in turn, to become a giver. Gifts are thus “gen-
erative.” Such generativity is reflected in the creation poem in the first
chapter of Genesis: each kind of life produces more life “after its kind.”165
It is also embedded in the cultural mandate given to humanity: “Be fruitful
and multiply.”166
The proper response to such abundance is gratitude. In the Torah,
God’s people are required to offer a substantial portion of their wealth back
to God in thanksgiving for his generous provision.167 A portion of these
offerings were designated to support the Priestly class, whose ministrations
were understood as essential to the health and prosperity of the nation.168
The Hebrew Bible’s historical books describe the construction of the First
Temple, for which the greatest craftsmen and artists in the land provided
exquisite ornamentation and articles of worship.169 In the great summary
vision in the New Testament Book of Revelation, the kings of the earth
bring their wealth into the heavenly city, where God and his people
dwell.170 These are each pictures of the right communal human response to
God’s gracious gift of creation and salvation.
These images suggest that it is good and proper for citizens of “the
city” to recognize and respond to the gifts of culture makers with offerings
from the abundance made possible by those gifts. For a creator to receive
recognition and material substance from the community is a fitting re-
sponse. A system of intellectual property that expresses gratitude for the
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
165. See Genesis 1.
166. Genesis 1:28.
167. For a discussion of the Hebrew Bible’s economic laws, see CHRISTOPHER J. H. WRIGHT,
OLD TESTAMENT ETHICS FOR THE PEOPLE OF GOD (2013).
168. See Numbers 18:8–10 (New International Version): “Then the Lord said to Aaron, ‘I
myself have put you in charge of the offerings presented to me; all the holy offerings the Israelites
give me I give to you and your sons as your portion, your perpetual share. You are to have the part
of the most holy offerings that is kept from the fire. From all the gifts they bring me as most holy
offerings, whether grain or sin or guilt offerings, that part belongs to you and your sons. Eat it as
something most holy; every male shall eat it. You must regard it as holy.’”
169. See 2 Chronicles 2:4.
170. See Revelation 21: 9–27. For a wonderfully evocative discussion of what it might mean
for the “kinds of the earth” to bring their treasures into the heavenly city, see RICHARD J. MOUW,
WHEN THE KINGS COME MARCHING IN: ISAIAH AND THE NEW JERUSALEM (2002).
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generativity of its creators can therefore be virtuous. It can be good for
authors and inventors to receive income from their work.
But notice that what is given is first a gift, what is exchanged is grati-
tude, and the result is continual generativity. In contrast, a system built on
greed will distort these values. It will not “incentivize” true invention and
creativity; it will turn the creators of culture away from common flourishing
and in on themselves.
A gift is something freely given. When the recipient has not earned the
gift, that is grace. In any Christian ontology, such as the one I have tried to
develop in this paper, grace must occupy a central place alongside love. The
Triune God’s act of ecstatic self-giving in the creation of the universe was
not something God needed, nor was it something the universe had earned.
Creation, therefore, is already grace. There is in fact no way to utterly sepa-
rate “nature” from “grace,” for there is no such thing as “pure nature”
(natura pura) apart from God’s gracious act of creation.171 Nature antici-
pates grace, and grace perfects nature.172
The link between creative human activity and grace is evident in the
Torah’s gleanings laws. During the harvest, some portion of the produce
would fall to the ground. The gleanings laws required land owners to leave
this produce for the poor to collect.173 The poor were not required to earn
their right to the gleanings. It was a rule designed to enculturate practices of
grace.
There are ways in which modern intellectual property law reflects
some similar concepts, for example copyright’s fair use doctrine, or the
compulsory license system for patents under TRIPS. These policies, how-
ever, are not always effective and often are not specifically tied to the needs
of the poor. Perhaps one reason for this impasse is a lack of faith and imagi-
nation concerning the true nature and super-natural purpose of human cul-
ture, which is really to say the same thing: culture is always a gracious gift
to humanity, and as such its cultivation must encompass and benefit all
humanity.
Consider the paradigmatic example of the access to medicines and or-
phan drug problems.174 The pharmaceutical industry in the United States
and Europe, and increasingly in India, has provided great benefits to hu-
manity. A model of drug discovery that depends utterly on private capital
171. See Cunningham, supra 139, at 244.  As Cunningham notes, “if the hypothetical idea of a
pure nature is allowed to become real, so to speak, if it is allowed to materialize, or even if the
hypothesis is conferred too much importance then we do indeed participate in the lie of the Anti-
Christ: that there could be such a thing as a man without the Christ.” Id. at 244.
172. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I, Q.1, Art. 8 (in vol. 1 of Benziger 1948).
173. See Leviticus 23:22 (New International Version): “When you reap the harvest of your
land, do not reap to the very edges of your field or gather the gleanings of your harvest. Leave
them for the poor and for the foreigner residing among you. I am the Lord your God.”
174. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game,
58 VAND. L. REV. 501 (2005).
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and blockbuster patents, however, is unsustainable and inequitable. The
stock markets should not serve as the primary source of health care finance.
The access to medicines and orphan drug problems that are caused or exac-
erbated by TRIPS-type patent policies will never be resolved as long as
drug discovery is primarily funded by private capital.
This is not to suggest that publicly traded pharmaceutical and biotech-
nology companies whose valuations are tied to patents should be shut down
or controlled by the government. In purely econometric terms, this sort of
model can offer important direct and spillover benefits. Nevertheless, the
legal, or at least perceived, need to maximize shareholder welfare at the
expense of other values inevitably undermines the kinds of social relation-
ships that inculcate virtues such as generosity and gratitude.
Present debates over health care finance, particularly in the United
States, are of course extensive and heated in the present historical moment,
and it is beyond the scope of this essay to attempt any kind of comprehen-
sive resolution. For now, I simply highlight the notion that a thick meta-
physic of culture, in which culture is understood as gift, demands
significant change to the means by which drug discovery and development
is presently financed.
2. Persons, Social Relations, and Echoes of the Triune
Creator-God
A robust theology of the gift can inform a view of human persons and
cultures that is metaphysically rich enough to support a social relations per-
spective on property and IPRs. Theologian David L. Schindler develops the
relation between gift, anthropology, and markets in his penetrating essay,
Market Liberalism and an Economic Culture of Gift and Gratitude.175
Schindler argues that human beings are constituted as “individuals” only in
relation to God: “Each man has his meaning as an individual only from
within this original and abiding ontological community with God.”176 This
ordering of social relations between God and humans extends to human
relationships with other humans: “The human person has an inherent social
dimension which calls a person from the innermost depths of self to com-
munion with others and to the giving of self to others.”177 While liberal
anthropologies emphasize self-determination and creativity, they do so from
an individualistic framework.178 In contrast, Schindler argues, “self-deter-
mination and creativity, understood in their rightful creaturely structure, are
175. DAVID L. SCHINDLER, Market Liberalism and an Economic Culture of Gift and Grati-
tude, in ORDERING LOVE: LIBERAL SOCIETIES AND THE MEMORY OF GOD, at 166–218 (2011).
176. Id. at 169 (emphasis in original). Schindler notes that “[i]n the words of John Paul II,
‘relation to God is a constitute element of [one’s] very “nature” and “existence”: it is in God that
we ‘live and move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28).’”
177. Id. at 169.
178. Id. at 186.
2013] BEYOND BITS, MEMES AND UTILITY MACHINES 769
grateful-responsive acts of self-giving; and the freedom of the self, accord-
ingly, is first not simply an option or act of choice, but an act of love.”179
Most Christians who have thought seriously about creation and anthro-
pology will agree with Schindler about the basic claim that human beings
are created for relationship with God and others. Many, however, will adopt
the “realist” stance that public policy and public markets cannot instantiate
this belief in a fallen, sinful world.180 In response, Schindler argues that this
is not a “realist” view at all. If, as Augustine and Aquinas said, man always
desires God, then “the desire for God, community, and love . . . are never
merely ‘ideal.’”181 These are, in fact, what is real.182
That which is un-real seeks to deny and resist such desire. Bald in-
stances of individual self-interest cannot aggregate into “real” justice be-
cause bald self-interest is a vice.183 Like all vices, bald instances of self-
interest require, “conversion, however much it is also simultaneously recog-
nized that this vice will never, in the present condition of the world, be
entirely removed from the heart of man.”184
For Schindler, the “reality” of a relational ontology further explains
why appeals to the fecundity of the market, standing alone, will not suffice.
“Efficiency” and “productivity” are terms that beg fundamental questions:
Efficient at what? Productive for what? “Both the process of production
itself and the artifact produced,” Schindler suggests, “are of higher quality
when formed in love and indeed as love than they are when formed prima-
rily in profitable self-interest . . . . Furthermore, the persons of both the self
and the other are enhanced more fully and truly in the former case than in
the latter.”185 Indeed, Schindler argues, the very notion of “abundance” re-
quires definition:
Rightful material abundance involves dynamic integration of the
self into the fullness of the truth, goodness, and beauty of the
others (including God and all others in relation to God) to whom
179. Id.
180. The father of modern “Christian Realism” is Reinhold Niebuhr. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR,
CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS (Scribner 1953). Niebuhr’s “Christian Realism,”
which stresses the need for pragmatic action in a fallen world, should be distinguished from meta-
physical realism. Many contemporary political theologians who emphasize metaphysical realism
would not agree with Niebuhr’s thoroughgoing pragmatism. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH
THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH’S WITNESS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY (2011).
181. SCHINDLER, supra note 175, at 182.
182. Cf. PABST, supra note 131, at xxvii (“the relational ordering of all things suggests a
priority of relation over substance, which intimates a first principle and final end that is itself
relational—the creative relationality of the three divine persons that brings everything out of noth-
ing into actuality and gives all beings a share of Trinitarian being in which the created order
participates.”).
183. SCHINDLER, supra note 175, at 183.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 183.
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the self is constitutively related . . . abundance is to be integrated
in terms of the need ‘to be rich toward God’ (Luke 12:21).186
A Trinitarian relational ontology of culture suggests that the offering
of cultural goods is inherently valuable. God pronounced the creation “very
good” not because it maximized His utility—God has never lacked any-
thing and so “maximization” with respect to God is nonsense—but because
it was, in itself, as given by Him, very good. By analogy, when a musician
or painter or other artist extends himself or herself into a creative work, that
gift to the world possesses inherent worth. We ought to value such gifts and
respond to them with appropriate gratitude, including the material support
of the artist’s work, just as the Torah required God’s people to support the
work of the Temple.187
Here we must acknowledge that the analogy becomes strained because
of another important theological category: the imperfection of humanity. In
the Christian tradition, humanity is “fallen” as a result of our primordial and
continual rebellion against God. Though the nature and result of the “fall”
are debated, the breadth of the Christian tradition clearly holds that human
beings are unlike God not only in our inherent creaturely limitations, but
also in our separation from God resulting from our own refusal of the good
and choice of evil.188 One implication of this truth is that human culture is
never just as it should be. Not every act of human creation is truly a partici-
pation in the gift of God’s creativity—indeed, the bulk of the Christian
tradition would suggest that no human being, this side of the eschaton, ever
completely participates in the Divine.
It follows that human creation should not be valued merely as creation,
but rather that the value of human creation inheres in the extent to which it
participates in the good. In other words, a robust theology of culture re-
quires a theological aesthetic. As Eastern Orthodox theologian David
Bently Hart has noted, there is “a marvelous naı¨vete´ in the response most
immediately provoked by the beautiful: neither in the Bible nor in patristic
theology is God’s goodness, truth or lordship distinguished from his glory,
savor, or awesome holiness; that God is good may be seen and tasted; and
this means that a theology of beauty should not scruple to express itself at
times as an ontology, an epistemology, or an ethics.”189
All of this means that concepts such as “open source” or “open cul-
ture”—the darlings of many liberal intellectual property scholars—are not
enough. A notion of “open” culture is a necessary condition for democratic
exchange, and therefore systems of oppressive surveillance and censorship
186. Id. at 184.
187. See Numbers 18:8–20.
188. For an excellent Patristic treatment of this subject, written around 335 A.D., see SAINT
ATHANASIUS, ON THE INCARNATION (St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press 2011).
189. DAVID BENTLEY HART, THE BEAUTY OF THE INFINITE: THE AESTHETICS OF CHRISTIAN
TRUTH 21 (2003).
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should be opposed.190 But “open” culture is not sufficient for the cultivation
of beauty. Much of what happens on the open Internet, for example, is foul
and ugly: child pornography is perhaps the most plain, pervasive, and dis-
turbing example. In fact, things like child pornography are not acts of culti-
vation at all—they are acts of destruction, of anti-creation, and of death.
Public patronage of the arts that includes discernment about beauty as a
meaningful aspect of created reality is therefore essential.
In this respect I agree with Professor Paul Griffiths, a keynote pre-
senter at this Symposium on “Intellectual Property and Religious
Thought.”191 In his Symposium paper and in his book The Intellectual Ap-
petite, Professor Griffiths emphasizes the theme of human cultural produc-
tion as a form of creaturely participation in the Divine gift of creation.192
For Professor Griffiths, it is improper to speak of human beings as “cre-
ators” of anything, for “creation” refers to the act of bringing forth some-
thing new ex nihilo.193 Griffiths would take issue, it seems, with the
delightful lyric from Stephen Sondheim’s Sunday in the Park with George:
Look, I made a hat—
Where there never was a hat!194
In fact, Professor Griffiths might say to Sondheim’s “George” charac-
ter that there was a hat—in the models, ideas, and raw materials that in-
formed George about what a “hat” is and should be. Of course, this would
not imply that God literally dreams of “hats,” but just that humans conceive
of nothing that is not already inherent in the logos of creation, received
from God as gift. And so, Professor Griffiths concludes, human beings can-
not “own” intangibles like they might own or possess physical things.195
This leads him to argue that material support for artists, musicians, scholars,
and other “creative” types should usually come in the form of patronage
rather than from market exchanges.196
I am broadly sympathetic to Profressor Griffiths’ conclusion. Re-
turning to the example of pharmaceutical products, “patronage” could in-
volve funding from public resources, as currently is the case for the large
amount of basic biomedical research in the United States that is funded
through the National Institutes of Health.197 The present model, in which
190. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 795 (2012).
191. See Paul J. Griffiths, The Natural Right of Property and the Impossibility of Owning the
Intangible: A Tension in Catholic Thought, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 101 (forthcoming 2014).
192. PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, INTELLECTUAL APPETITE: A THEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR (2009).
193. See id.
194. Stephen Sondheim, LOOK, I MADE A HAT: COLLECTED LYRICS (1981–2011) WITH AT-
TENDANT COMMENTS, AMPLIFICATIONS, DOGMAS, HARANGUES, DIGRESSIONS, ANECDOTES, AND
MISCELLANY 27 (2011).
195. Griffiths, supra note 191.
196. Id.
197. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov.
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basic research is substantially publicly funded and downstream end-product
research is funded through stock and venture capital markets (via private or
publicly traded biotech and pharmaceutical firms), ensures that applied drug
research responds to private financial rewards rather than global public
health needs. This is particularly problematic when differing demand elas-
ticities skew research and development priorities away from populations
that bear the bulk of the world’s disease burdens.198 A more just and loving
order would seek to allocate the gift of scientific and technological discov-
ery in medicines towards afflicted populations regardless of their ability to
pay prices that can sustain patent rents.
At the same time, the reception of some kinds of creative goods prop-
erly may involve the reciprocity of morally conditioned markets. As Pope
Benedict also stated in Caritas in Veritate,
authentically human social relationships of friendship, solidarity
and reciprocity can also be conducted within economic activity,
and not only outside it or “after” it. The economic sphere is
neither ethically neutral, nor inherently inhuman and opposed to
society. It is part and parcel of human activity and precisely be-
cause it is human, it must be structured and governed in an ethical
manner.199
Indeed, Pope Benedict continued, “in commercial relationships the princi-
ple of gratuitousness and the logic of gift as an expression of fraternity can
and must find their place within normal economic activity.”200 For this rea-
son, the Pope argued,
alongside profit-oriented private enterprise and the various types
of public enterprise, there must be room for commercial entities
based on mutualist principles and pursuing social ends to take
root and express themselves. It is from their reciprocal encounter
in the marketplace that one may expect hybrid forms of commer-
cial behaviour to emerge, and hence an attentiveness to ways of
civilizing the economy.201
These concerns extend particularly to the use of education, social media,
and technology to promote human development.202
In these statements from Caritas in Veritate, we can perhaps discern a
place for the many “hybrid” forms of market exchange that have begun to
characterize cultural production in the information age: the Creative Com-
mons, open source and peer production models, “maker” and “crafter” cul-
ture, fair trade practices, community cooperatives, e-publishing, and so-on,
along with more “traditional” markets for literature, education, and the
198. See Opderbeck, supra note 174.
199. Pope Benedict, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 78, at ¶ 36.
200. Id. (emphasis in original).
201. Id. at ¶ 38.
202. Id. at ¶¶ 68–75.
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arts.203 Most of these models take advantage of existing flexibilities in intel-
lectual property law, such as the ability to license derivative works (Crea-
tive Commons), fair use, and certification marks. In some ways these
flexibilities may represent the inherent seeds of intellectual property law’s
redemption.
VII. CONCLUSION
“Reality, most basically considered, is an order of love.”204 The meta-
physical basis for a theory of intellectual property as social relations is the
love of God poured out in the gift of creation, including the creation of
human beings in God’s image who are uniquely endowed with the capacity
of co-creation after God’s image. Human creativity and invention find their
basis in God’s creativity and invention. As God made the “very good” of
the created order, human creative activity should be oriented toward the
flourishing of all of creation.205 Indeed, this is the meaning of the “cultural
mandate” God first gave to humanity.206 This realization should prompt
fresh reflection on the nature and scope of claims to ownership of human
cultural products.
These suggestions, of course, are not in themselves novel. What I have
endeavored to do is show how themes such as these can be rooted in a
richer social imagination that gives them meaning and weight. When we
skip over reasons and merely offer prescriptions—or perhaps worse, when
our reasons are anemic, or worse yet, when our reasons reflect a distorted
ontology of selfishness—the goods we are able to achieve will suffer ac-
cordingly. Christian and other religious scholars can therefore offer the
world great gifts: the gifts of reason, purpose, and love.
203. See New Economies, Innovative Markets, RESPUBLICA, http://www.respublica.org.uk/
units-new-economies—innovative-markets (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
204. David L. Schindler, Preface, in ORDERING LOVE, supra note 98, at ix (emphasis added).
205. See Genesis 1:31.
206. See Genesis 1:28. At times both religious interpreters and secular critics have read Gene-
sis 1:28 as a license to despoil the planet. Nothing could be further from the sense of the text. In
fact, the text suggests that human beings are appointed to love and care for the Earth as God’s
representatives. See, e.g., FRED BAHNSON & NORMAN WIRZBA, MAKING PEACE WITH THE LAND:
GOD’S CALL TO RECONCILE WITH CREATION (2012).
